The price e¤ects of the Swedish pharmaceutical substitution reform are analyzed using data for a panel of all pharmaceutical product sold in Sweden in [1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007]. The price reduction due to the reform was estimated to average 10% and was found to be signi…cantly larger for brand name pharmaceuticals than for generics. The results also imply that the reform ampli…ed the e¤ect that generic entry has on brand-name prices by a factor of ten. Results of a demand-estimation imply that the price reductions increased total pharmaceutical consumption by 8% and consumer welfare by SEK 2.7 billion annually.
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This paper contributes to this literature by, for example, providing the …rst test of whether or not a substitution reform also a¤ects pharmaceuticals that do not face generic competition.
A few related papers estimate price and income elasticities for pharmaceuticals on an aggregated level; for example, Alexander et al. (1994) , that examine how the demand for all pharmaceuticals (and not just a single product or group of products) is a¤ected by changed income and pharmaceutical prices (and not just out-of-pocket costs) on a national level. As discussed by Getzen (2000) , elasticities vary with the level of analysis, since elasticities on di¤erent levels are a¤ected by partly di¤erent decisions. The results of the present paper are therefore not directly comparable to price and income elasticities estimated on a micro level. The present paper also relates to studies evaluating welfare e¤ects of di¤erent reforms, for example Watal (2000) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006) , which both estimated the welfare losses caused from enforcing pharmaceutical patents in India. This paper contributes to the literature analyzing the e¤ect of generic entry on brand-name pharmaceutical prices, by studying how a substitution reform in ‡uences this e¤ect. To my knowledge, this has never been studied before.
The empirical results in the literature analyzing the price e¤ects of generic entry are mixed. On one hand, Caves et al. (1991) found that the initial entry of generic products led to a reduction in brand-name prices. Similarly, Wiggins and Maness (1994) and Lu and Comanor (1998) found that the number of generic products had a negative e¤ect on brand-name prices. On the other 1 The National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies et al. (2003 Pharmacies et al. ( , 2004 aimed to assess the savings due to increased price competition, but did not account for expiring patents or pricetrends in their reports and based their estimates on a non-representative sample consisting of the substances with the largest sales values.
hand, Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Frank and Salkever (1997) reported that brand-name prices rose in response to generic entry. One explanation of this is that generic entry reduces the own-price elasticity of brand-name products Salkever, 1992, 1997) . Frank and Salkever (1992) also demonstrated that, if consumers become more price-sensitive, under reasonable conditions this will increase the downward pressure exerted by generic entry on brand-name prices.
The next section describes the context and the substitution reform. In section three, I discuss the empirical approach, …rst, for estimating the reform's e¤ects on prices, and second, regarding the welfare measure and the demand function. Section three also contains some descriptive statistics. In section four, I present the results of the various estimations and in section …ve I discuss other possible welfare e¤ects. Finally, the paper's conclusions are presented in section six.
Swedish pharmaceutical bene…ts scheme
Subsidies have covered a large part of the pharmaceutical costs for Swedish consumers ever since pharmaceutical bene…ts scheme was introduced in 1955. 2 Since January 1997, a stepwise copayment structure for pharmaceuticals has been used to limit consumers' pharmaceutical costs. At …rst, consumers paid all costs up to SEK 400 per 12-month period, 50% of the cost from SEK 400 to 1200, 25% from SEK 1200 to 2800, and 10% from SEK 2800 to 3800; after this level, all costs in the period were covered by subsidies. 3 As of 1 June 1999, all these break-points were increased by SEK 500, but have since remained unchanged.
Before the substitution reform, a reference price system, introduced in January 1993, was in e¤ect. Reference prices were set to 110% of the cheapest available substitute products, and costs exceeding these reference prices were not included in the maximum annual copayment limit (RFFS 1992 (RFFS :20, 1996 . 2 The sources used in this section are SFS (1981:49) and the government bills dealing with changes in this law. These bills are listed at www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/fakta/a9810049.htm, 30 October 2008. 3 All monetary values in this paper (except those regarding copayments cited in this section)
are de ‡ated by the CPI and expressed in 2007 prices. The average exchange rates in 2007 were USD/SEK = 6.76 and EUR/SEK = 9.25 (the Riksbank).
The substitution reform
The substitution reform came into e¤ect 1 October 2002 and replaced the ref-
erence price system. This reform requires pharmacists to inform consumers whether substitute products are available, and that the cheapest available substitute product would be provided within the Swedish pharmaceutical bene…ts scheme. 4 The pharmacist must also inform consumers that they can buy the prescribed pharmaceutical product instead of the cheapest substitute if they pay the price di¤erence themselves. Finally, the substitution reform requires that pharmacists substitute the cheapest available generic (or parallel-imported product) for the prescribed pharmaceutical product in cases when neither the prescribing physician prohibits the substitution for medical reasons, nor the consumer chooses to pay the price di¤erence between the prescribed and the generic alternative. In cases where the physician prohibits the substitution for medical reasons, the consumer is still reimbursed.
Three characteristics of the substitution reform may have contributed to making consumers more price sensitive, which in turn has resulted in more generic substitution and lower pharmaceutical prices. First, the substitution reform lowered the transaction cost of generic substitution, since before the substitution reform it was recommended that the physicians be contacted before substituting products if they had not explicitly consented to substitution on the prescriptions. Second, when substitution is presented as an option (as it always should be after the substitution reform) consumers gain information about that cheaper substitutes exist and can easily gain information also about price di¤erences between the pharmaceutical substitutes. Finally, under the substitution reform, only costs up to 100% of the cheapest substitutable product were contained by the pharmaceutical bene…t scheme, compared with 110% in the reference price system. This increased the consumer's out-of-pocket costs for choosing to buy the prescribed pharmaceutical by 0-10 percent of the price of the cheapest generic version, depending on the patient's copayment rate.
According to a theoretical model presented by Granlund and Rudholm (2007) , the substitution reform likely has a greater e¤ect on prices for brands that face generic competition than for generics. The intuition is that, while the fact that the substitution reform made consumers more cross-price sensitive 4 The Swedish Medical Products Agency de…nes a product as a substitute if it has the same active substance, strength, and form (e.g. pills or oral ‡uid) as the prescribed product, and if its package sizes can approximately sum up to the prescribed quantity.
works for lower prices in both product groups, the substitution reform also increases the demand for generics at the expense of the demand for brand-name products, which likely reduces the incentives for generics to lower their prices but increases the likelihood of price cuts for brand-names.
Brand-name products without generic competition are likely a¤ected less by the substitution reform than other brands, but should still be a¤ected. At least some of these products are substitutes for pharmaceuticals subject to generic competition and hence face lower demand as the prices of these pharmaceuticals drop, which -depending on the shape of their demand functions -might cause price cuts. Patent-protected pharmaceuticals might also be directly a¤ected by the substitution reform, since many of them face competition from cheaper parallel-imported pharmaceuticals.
The prices in the Others group, consisting, for example, of vitamins and/or minerals, is expected to be a¤ected relatively little by the substitution reform, since few of these products have what the Swedish Medical Products Agency considers to be close substitutes.
Price setting and distribution
Throughout the study period, for a pharmaceutical to be included in the bene…ts scheme, its price had to be authorized, before October 2002 by the National Social Insurance Board and thereafter by the Pharmaceutical Bene…ts Board.
It was easier for pharmaceutical …rms to get Pharmaceutical Bene…ts Board approvals of price reductions than price increases, except if the new price did not exceed the price of the most expensive exchangeable product. 5 This fact, together with pharmaceutical …rms' incomplete information about the reactions of physicians, consumers and other pharmaceutical …rms to the substitution reform, gave …rms an incentive to adjust their prices gradually after the substitution reform of October 2002. Since the exception means that most generics could increase their prices as easy as they could reduce them, one might expect fastest price adjustments for generics; but, since their brand-competitors likely will not adjust their price immediately, neither will the generics. 5 The Pharmaceutical Bene…ts Board is required to decide whether to approve price cuts as soon as possible, but is allowed 90 days (or under some circumstances 150 days) to handle applications for price increase (SFS 2002:687) . Firms must justify price increases, but not price reductions. Also, the Pharmaceutical Bene…ts Board is restrictive in allowing price increases and only allows an increase if special reasons exist (LFNFS 2003:1) .
Throughout the study period, pharmaceuticals were sold through a nationwide government owned monopoly, the National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies, which paid and charged uniform prices nationwide for each pharmaceutical product.
3 Methods and material 3.1 Estimating the substitution reform' s e¤ects on prices
The substitution reform's e¤ects on prices are estimated using monthly data, from January 1997 through October 2007, provided by IMS Sweden for all pharmaceuticals sold in Sweden. The reform e¤ects were estimated separately for Generics, 6 brand-name pharmaceuticals that faced generic competition at the time of reform (BrandC), 7 brand-name pharmaceuticals that did not face generic competition at that time (BrandM ), and a group of products belonging to none of these groups (Others), using the following speci…cation
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the price per package paid by the National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies, and thus charged by the pharmaceutical companies, for product i in month t. Product refers to the most detailed observation unit: for example, if a brand and a generic …rm market two package sizes each of the same pharmaceutical, they are treated as four separate products even if the two …rms'package sizes are the same.
D is an indicator variable taking the value of one after the substitution reform, that is, in October 2002 and thereafter. D=(t R), where t R is the number of months from the reform time, is included to capture the adjustment process. Here, the parameter measures the curvature of the adjustment process. 6 The generics group also includes so-called branded generics. Branded generics are generic versions of the pharmaceutical product which are sold under their own product name, while other generics are sold under the substance name, usually followed by the company name. 7 A product is de…ned as facing generic competition if at least one generic or branded generic has the same active substance, strength, and form (e.g. pills or oral ‡uid) as the product. Since, for example, a product comprising 20 pills can be replaced by two packages of 10 pills each, a brand-name product is de…ned as facing generic competition even if its package size di¤ers from that of its generic competitors.
GC it is a dummy that takes the value of one from the …rst month product i faces generic competition and is only included for the two brand-name populations. By comparing the GC it coe¢ cient between the two brand populations, I
can examine how the substitution reform has a¤ected the price e¤ect of generic competition.
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A trend variable (T rend) is included to account for possible common price trends. Finally, product-speci…c …xed e¤ects ( i ) are included. These capture all the time-invariant di¤erences in price levels between pharmaceutical products and thus make it possible to use the natural logarithm of the price per package as the dependent variable.
By letting the prices adjust gradually to the substitution reform, the estimation approach used here follows Granlund and Rudholm (2007) . The speci…ca-tion assumes that the potential price adjustment was largest directly after the substitution reform and gradually decreased as time passed. This is a logical assumption, since pharmaceutical …rms' knowledge of physicians', consumers' and other pharmaceutical …rms'reactions to the substitution reform likely increased fastest directly after the substitution reform when the knowledge level was lowest. However, it is di¢ cult to make any a priori assumptions about the speed of this process, so is allowed to be determined by the data.
This speci…cation of the adjustment is likely to give good estimates of the substitution reform e¤ects in the study period. It is, however, unsuitable for out-of-sample predictions (at least, for predictions into the far future), since the speci…cation assumes that -unless the adjustment is instantaneous (i.e., 2 =0)
-the adjustment will continue inde…nitely. An alternate approach sometimes used in reform evaluations is to let the trend slope change with the reform. This is reasonable when evaluating reforms that might indeed change the trend slope, but when considering a reform like that examined here, which presumably will result in a new long-term price level but not a new long-term price trend, the risk of this approach is that it will ascribe price-changes unrelated to the substitution reform, to the reform e¤ect. 9 8 Generic competition directly followed expiring patent on many products which suggests that much of the variation in GC it is exogenous in the sense that it is explained by expiring patents rather than price changes of the brand-name products. In the absence of strong, truly exogenous instruments, it is preferable to treat this variable as exogenous rather than employing an instrumental variable method. 9 These changes could be caused, for example, by the introduction of new pharmaceuticals that lower the demand for pharmaceutical for which they are substitutes and by changes in pharmaceutical markets in other countries (e.g., regarding price-controls).
As mentioned above, the break-points in the pharmaceutical bene…ts scheme were increased by SEK 500 in June 1999. One might expect that this would have made consumers more price sensitive by increasing their copayment rates, which, in turn, might have encouraged pharmaceutical …rms to lower their prices. However, due to the construction of Swedish pharmaceutical bene…ts scheme and due to the skewed distribution of consumers'pharmaceutical consumption, most of the pharmaceuticals were bought by consumers who, regardless of this increase, had zero marginal cost for pharmaceuticals. 10 Therefore, this change likely had, at most, minor e¤ects on prices. Estimations including controls for the increased break-points, and for delayed responses to this increase and to the bene…ts scheme changes of January 1997, indicated no price e¤ects and gave only marginally di¤erent results for the parameters of interest, so these results are not reported.
Letting the parameter estimates di¤er between the four pharmaceutical groups will improve the e¢ ciency of the estimators, if these groups are differently a¤ected by the substitution reform, and makes it possible to test, for example, whether the substitution reform also a¤ected the prices of pharmaceuticals for which there are no generic substitutes. To do this by splitting the population, instead of by using interaction variables, keeps the models nonlinear in only one variable -the adjustment variable D=(t R) -which allows the speci…cation to be easily estimated using a grid-search estimation strategy. This method is employed for each model by setting equal to values ranging from 0 to 5 and then estimating the remaining parameters using a Prais-Winsten estimator that corrects for …rst-order serial correlation in the error terms. Finally, likelihood values were used to discriminate between the di¤erent parameter values. The likelihood values were also used to calculate 95% con…dence intervals for the adjustment parameter, .
In all estimations, the observations are assigned weights that equal the products'total sales values in the study period; if the reform e¤ects are correlated with sales values, this is necessary when estimating how the substitution reform a¤ected the pharmaceutical price levels. As for price indexes, there are several alternate sets of weights that can be used, so I have reported the results 1 0 Data from the county of Västerbotten show that 54-61% of the pharmaceuticals in 2000
were bought by consumers, who had reached the new highest break-point of the insurance before, or on, the current purchasing occasion. Since at the time of purchasing, consumers are on average approximately 6 months into the 12-month insurance period, a higher share than this had a marginal cost of zero after the reform as well.
obtained also when using pre-reform sales as weights.
Demand and welfare estimation
Hausman (1981) demonstrated that knowledge of the uncompensated (i.e., the Marshallian) demand function is all that is needed to establish an exact measure of the welfare e¤ects caused by changed prices. The welfare e¤ects can be expressed either in terms of compensating variation (CV) or, as here, in terms of equivalent variation (EV).
In this context, the EV formula derived by Hausman is written
where 1 is the price elasticity of demand and 2 is the income elasticity of demand, both of which must be estimated. P ref is the index for pharmacies' selling prices of pharmaceuticals, and P alt is given by
ARE is short for the average reform e¤ect and is obtained by weighting together the predicted reform e¤ects for the four pharmaceutical groups. The di¤erence between the coe¢ cient of GC it after and before the substitution reform in October 2002 is treated as part of the reform e¤ects. Finally, Q(:) is the predicted annual pharmaceutical demand at various price levels and I is annual income.
If both the price and the income elasticity equal zero, the EV measures equal the extra amount that consumption after the substitution reform would have cost without the price-lowering e¤ect of the substitution reform. Since P ref is an index for the full prices of pharmaceuticals, and not only the out-ofpocket prices paid by the consumers, the EV will measure the welfare e¤ects of the price cuts for the whole consumer side of the market, both directly for the consumers and for the insurers. The cost of the pharmaceutical bene…ts scheme is still paid for by the consumers -in the Swedish case, by income taxes -but the distinction is still important if, for example, one wishes to consider the distributional e¤ects of the substitution reform.
Bear in mind that the reform e¤ects are estimated using the pharmacies' purchase prices. Nevertheless, I have still chosen to use the pharmacies'selling prices in the EV measures and in estimating the price elasticity ( 1 ). The justi…cation is that pharmaceutical demand is most closely related to the selling prices. If the pharmacies'margins are a¤ected by the substitution reform, however, the choice may cause an inconsistency in the EV measures. As reported in the Results section, the Pharmaceutical Bene…ts Board has allowed increased margins because the substitution reform has increased pharmacies'costs. However, it is impossible to know whether some of these increases would have been allowed in any case, even without the substitution reform, and then justi…ed on other grounds. In the Results section, I therefore focus on the EV measures obtained by assuming that margins were una¤ected by the substitution reform, but also report EV measures obtained by adjusting the average reform e¤ect (ARE) in line with the margin changes justi…ed by the substitution reform.
Since I want to calculate the EV for the substitution reform that has a¤ected the entire pharmaceutical market, and not just the prices of a few drugs, the price and income elasticity should be estimated on an aggregated level. 11 Since the elasticities might di¤er between countries, the estimation should preferably be done using Swedish data. As mentioned above, no cross-sectional variation in pharmaceutical prices was allowed in Sweden in the study period, implying that the demand function (or at least the price elasticity) must be identi…ed using only variation over time. As discussed below, several di¢ culties are associated with this, so I will also calculate the EV measures based on demand estimates made for other countries.
The uncompensated pharmaceutical demand in Sweden are estimated using aggregated quarterly data provided by the National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies, the Riksbank, and Statistics Sweden. The estimations are preformed using the following two speci…cations
q Quarter qt (D2)
which both are inspired by a speci…cation in Alexander et al. (1994) . Q t is de…ned as the pharmacies' total purchase of pharmaceuticals in quarter t, 1 1 Deriving the price elasticity of aggregated consumption from demand estimates based on product level data is unfeasible since it would require the estimation of all relevant cross-price elasticities between the nearly 15,000 pharmaceutical products. measured in SEK per 1000 inhabitants and working day, and divided by an index for pharmacies' purchase prices. P t is the index for pharmacies' selling prices of pharmaceuticals and I is GDP per capita in SEK 1000. ln indicates that the natural logarithms of the variables are used and indicates that the …rst di¤erences of the variables are used (e.g., ln Q t = ln Q t ln Q t 1 ). A trend variable is included and complemented by three quarter-dummies, since Andersson et al. (2007) report that there are seasonal variations in the sales values of pharmaceuticals.
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The variable Hoard is included to capture the hoarding that is observed in the quarters before increases in the patients'copayment shares and the corresponding decline in sales in the quarters directly after the changes. According to Dickey-Fuller tests, it cannot be rejected that the time series ln Q, ln P and ln I have unit roots. Since this non-stationarity might result in spurious regression it should be addressed. In this paper, two alternate approaches, each with di¤erent ‡aws and merits, are used to address nonstationarity. The …rst is to make a …rst-di¤erence transformation (speci…cation D1) and the second is to include lagged vales of pharmaceutical consumption (speci…cation D2). The choice to include the …rst and fourth lags (ln Q t 1 and 1 2 The main di¤erences between these speci…cations and the one in Alexander et al. (1994) are that I do not take the natural logarithm of the trend variable, since this would mean that the percentage change in the pharmaceutical consumption is assumed to decline with time, and that I either make a …rst-di¤erence transformation or include lagged consumption. I have also estimated a speci…cation similar to that of Alexander et al., and then obtained results similar to theirs, but concluded that the results likely were spurious, since statistical tests suggested that the included time series were non-stationary and not cointegrated. Both speci…cations ensure that the error terms are stationary and that the results are therefore not spurious. The …rst speci…cation addresses the nonstationarity of all variables and is suitable for estimating short-term e¤ects.
However, if ln P is endogenous, this approach is di¢ cult to use since it is inherently hard to …nd strong instruments for the …rst di¤erence of ln P . Regarding the second speci…cation, it should be noted that the coe¢ cients for lagged consumption can easily capture the e¤ects of omitted variables and therefore should not be interpreted as estimates of persistency in pharmaceutical consumption.
Hence, the long-term e¤ects cannot be estimated using this speci…cation. 13 Due to the auto-regressive processes of ln P and ln I, there is also a risk that some of the e¤ects of these variables will be attributed to the coe¢ cients for lagged pharmaceutical consumption. A conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that the second speci…cation is useful in investigating whether or not ln P is endogenous, but if ln P is not endogenous, or only weakly so, the …rst speci…cation is preferable.
Endogeneity has been discussed previously in this context. For example, Reekie (1978) assumed that sellers of pharmaceuticals set prices each period and o¤er to sell inde…nitely large amounts at that price in the period, arguing that prices are therefore determined largely by non-demand-related factors and thus can be treated as exogenous. It should, however, be noted that even if prices are predetermined, as they are on the Swedish market, demand expectations might play a role in the price setting, which might cause some endogeneity problems.
The speci…cations are estimated using both OLS and IV estimators and the error terms are allowed to be correlated within calendar years. In the IV estimations, ln P is instrumented with its second and fourth lag and with the …rst and second lag of the variable ln T CW . T CW is the total competitiveness weights index, which measures the value of the Swedish crown (SEK) against a basket of other currencies. The lags of ln T CW are included as instruments mainly to capture the sharp declines in the value of the Swedish crown that occurred when it was devaluated in September 1981 (-10%) and October 1982 (-16%) and when Sweden abandoned the …xed exchange rate in November 1992, which resulted in a depreciation of approximately 21% within three months. These events were likely unexpected when pharmaceutical prices were set and therefore likely caused price changes. Several other instruments, and combination of instruments, have also been tested. The choice of instrument-set is based on the Kleibergen-Paap weak identi…cation statistic, which measures the strength of the instruments, and the Hansen J statistic, which tests the validity of the instruments. In the BrandM population 810 of the 6,267 products gained generic competition at some time after the substitution reform, but Table 1 shows that the weighted frequency of observations facing competition is only 4%. In the BrandC population, consisting of brand-name pharmaceuticals that faced generic competition at the time of reform, 364 of the 989 products gained generic competition …rst after the beginning of the study period, but the weighted frequency of observations without competition is only 19%. The market shares show that
Descriptive statistics
BrandM is by far the most important population in terms of sales values. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the demand speci…cations are given in Table 2 . Figure 1 illustrates how the three main variables have changed per capita and the purchase of pharmaceuticals. time are also illustrated in Figure 2 .
Estimated reform e¤ects
The estimates of Ref mean indicate that the substitution reform has had signi…cant e¤ects on the prices in all pharmaceutical groups in the study period.
The largest relative price cut, 14%, is found in the population of brands that faced generic competition at the time of the substitution reform (BrandC); the second largest amounts to 10% and is found for brands that lacked generic competition at that time (BrandM ). A comparison of the estimates for GC in these two populations reveals another reform e¤ect: the price-e¤ect of getting generic competition goes from being merely -0.45% before the substitution reform to -4.78% after the substitution reform. Together, these results for brand-name pharmaceuticals indicate that the eventual reform e¤ect for those brands that gained generic competition sometime after the substitution reform is similar in size to the e¤ect for those that faced generic competition before the substitution reform.
The lowest estimated average reform e¤ect is -5% for Others, while the estimated average reform e¤ect is -9% for Generics. Using the market shares from Table 1 as weights, the average reform e¤ect over the four pharmaceutical groups is -9.87% (95% C.I. -10.29:-9.45) or -9.66% (95% C.I. -10.07:-9.24) when the e¤ect on GC is not included.
The results also clearly indicate that the pharmaceutical …rms had not fully adjusted their prices to the substitution reform already by October 2002: for the di¤erent populations, the instantaneous price cuts were 1-2%, compared with declines of 6-17% by the end of the study period. This conclusion is also strengthened by the fact that both 2 and di¤er signi…cantly from zero. As expected, the results indicate that the adjustment was fastest for Generics. Generics and for BrandM to -6.86% and -9.31, while it increases in absolute size to -15.89% for BrandM and to -5.91 for Others. In total, the weighted average reform e¤ect is reduced in absolute size by half a percentage point. 
Estimated demand and welfare e¤ects
The …rst column of Table 4 presents the OLS results for speci…cation (D1) (the …rst-di¤erence), while the second and third columns present the OLS and IV results for speci…cation (D2). No strong and valid instruments are found for ln P , so the IV results for the …rst-di¤erence speci…cation are not reported.
Let us start by noting that the estimates obtained using speci…cation (D1) di¤er quite substantially from those obtained using speci…cation (D2). This is expected, since the estimates of speci…cation (D1) describe how changes in the independent variable a¤ect the change in demand, while the estimates of speci…cation (D2) -given the high coe¢ cients for lagged consumption -more or less describe how the level of the independent variable a¤ects the change in demand. As discussed above, the coe¢ cients for lagged consumption can easily capture the e¤ects of omitted variables and should therefore not be interpreted as estimates of persistence in pharmaceutical consumption. Hansen J (P-value) 0.22
Notes: Robust 95% con…dence intervals are shown in parentheses.
** and * denote signi…cance at the 1% and 5% percent levels, respectively.
x o Note that Trend only becomes a constant in the …rst-di¤erence speci…cation.
The OLS and IV estimates for speci…cation (D2) di¤er less from each other.
If prices are endogenous, one would expect the OLS estimate in the second column to be larger than the IV estimate for ln P . Table 4 shows that this is the case, but the di¤erence is quite small and not statistically signi…cant.
The di¤erence might still indicate that there is an endogeneity problem, but the problem seems small in relation to the problem caused by including lagged consumption. Therefore, I view the results for speci…cation (D1) as the most reliable ones, and will focus my discussion on these estimates.
The price and income elasticity estimates for speci…cation (D1) are both signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and have the expected signs, indicating that consumption decreases with prices but increases with income. The results for speci…cation (D1) also indicate a considerable seasonal variation, and growth over time, in pharmaceutical demand. The estimate of -0.003 for the variable
Hoard suggests that a change in pharmaceutical bene…ts scheme that increases consumer prices for pharmaceuticals by 10% is preceded by a temporary increase of 3% in the demand. Since the estimates reported in Table 4 are not very robust, I have also calculated the EV measures using other values for the price and income elasticities. Zero is a logical upper bound for the price elasticity and gives a present value of the welfare e¤ects of SEK 12.96 billion. Economic theory provides no natural lower bound for the price elasticity; instead I report that the present value becomes SEK 12.05 billion when the price elasticity is set to -1.31 (the lower limit of the 95% con…dence interval of speci…cation (D1)), and SEK 10.86 billion when it is set to -3.25 (the estimate reported by Alexander et al.) . 
Other welfare e¤ects
The substitution reform of October 2002 of course has other welfare e¤ects besides those on the consumer-side in the form of reduced prices. Below, I
brie ‡y discuss other important welfare e¤ects, though it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide estimates of these.
The substitution of cheaper versions for prescribed pharmaceuticals has not reducing prices. For example, if the price elasticity of a …rm's products is -3, a price cut of 1% would increase revenues by nearly 2%. If the marginal costs are constant, this would raise the variable costs by 3% and thus increase the …rms pro…t if the variable costs are less than 2/3 of the revenues.
only led to increased price competition but also to direct savings. A rough estimate of these savings is SEK 0.6 billion per year. 16 There are, however, reasons not to consider the entire savings as constituting a welfare improvement for consumers. Andersson et al. (2005) and Granlund and Rudholm (2008) reported that signi…cant shares of Swedish consumers refused substitution and paid extra to get the prescribed instead of the generic (or parallel-imported)
pharmaceutical, indicating that they viewed the substitutes as inferior. Similarly, the Medical Products Agency (2004) reports that some consumers feel generic substitutes are less e¤ective than brand-name pharmaceuticals; generic substitution might therefore a¤ect patient willingness to follow physician recommendations. Generic substitution might also increase the risk that some consumers confuse di¤erent drugs.
Since the substitution reform has made consumers and physicians more familiar to generic pharmaceuticals, it might have a¤ected physicians'prescribing pattern. Generic substitution might also have increased the costs for the Pharmaceutical Bene…ts Board, which must make more decisions regarding price changes, and for physicians, who might have to answer questions about generic substitution from their patients.
17
The total producer surplus of the pharmaceutical …rms has clearly been reduced by the substitution reform: the revenues have declined and the costs have increased due to higher quantities. Some generic producers have likely bene…ted from the substitution reform due to increased market shares, while the pro…ts of brand-name producers have been a¤ected most negatively. Generic substitution also reduces the expected pro…ts arising from new pharmaceuticals and thus the incentive to invest in research and development. However, since the Swedish pharmaceutical market is small from a global perspective, this e¤ect is also small. by 10%. The reform e¤ect was found to be signi…cantly greater for brand-name than for generic products. The results also suggest that the substitution reform ampli…ed the e¤ect of generic entry on brand-name prices by a factor of ten.
This in turn has contributed to the reform e¤ect being of similar size for brandname products, irrespective of whether a product gained generic competition before or after the substitution reform.
The results con…rm the conclusion of Granlund and Rudholm (2007) , that pharmaceutical …rms gradually adjusted their prices after the substitution reform, and that prices of generics were reduced less than those of brands that faced generic competition is in accordance with their theoretical predictions.
The estimated reform e¤ects reported here, however, were signi…cantly larger than those obtained by Granlund and Rudholm. One important explanation is that the observations here were weighted to obtain estimates of welfare e¤ects due to increased price competition. This paper also di¤ers from Granlund and Rudholm (2007) by, for example, studying the e¤ects on all pharmaceutical products sold in Sweden, by using longer time series, and by studying the e¤ect on the prices charged by the pharmaceutical …rms, instead of those charged by the pharmacies.
The reform e¤ects reported here are also considerably larger than those that Buzzelli et al. (2006) estimated for 16 OECD countries. This di¤erence could be because the Swedish substitution reform was more successful in reducing prices than were the substitution reforms of the other 15 countries Buzzelli et al. studied. The di¤erence could also be because I, unlike them, used a speci…cation that allowed for gradual price adjustments after the substitution reform.
The results of this paper support the theoretical predictions of Frank and Salkever (1992) by indicating that the e¤ect of generic competition changes signi…cantly when consumers become more price sensitive, as they did with the Swedish substitution reform. How a substitution reform in ‡uences the e¤ects of generic entry has, to my knowledge, never been tested before.
The price elasticity was estimated to -0.76, which is more negative than most price elasticities for pharmaceuticals reported in the literature, but not directly comparable to many of those, since they measure the elasticities of pharmaceutical demand with respect to out-of-pocket prices for pharmaceuticals. If physicians' prescribing behavior is also a¤ected by the costs to the insurers, this reduces the e¤ect that changed copayments have on pharmaceutical demand. The price elasticity estimate is, however, considerably less negative than that reported by Alexander et al. (1994) . The income elasticity of 0.45 indicates that pharmaceutical consumption is a necessity in the short run. This can be compared with the long-term estimate reported by Alexander et al. (1994) and those summarized by Getzen (2000) , indicating that pharmaceuticals and healthcare on a national level are a luxuries. One explanation of these di¤erences is that pharmaceutical demand reacts slowly to changes in income.
The estimations of the demand for pharmaceuticals were, however, troubled by the non-stationarity of the key variables, so these elasticity estimates should be interpreted with caution. Fortunately, the welfare estimates expressed in equivalent variation are not very sensitive with respect to price and income elasticities, so the present value of the welfare e¤ects remains between SEK 12
and 13 billion for reasonable values of the elasticities. 
